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Can the agency reclaim its soul?
The EPAs
Faustian Bargain
By DAVID SCHOENBROD
New York Law School
RESIDENT RICHARD NIXON CREATED THE
Environmental Protection Agency and Con-
gress passed the Clean Air Act in 1970
because the public demanded protection. The
pollution that worried voters most was lead
in gasoline and its effects on children. The
bumper stickers read: "GET THE LEAD OUT."
Congress, in the Clean Air Act, took responsibility for a rule
that would eventually reduce lead exposure. The act authorized
the EPA to require that new cars made from 1975 onward use
only lead-free gas.
Lawmakers' motivation in backing this rule was not, how-
ever, to protect children from lead. Congress had decided that
auto manufacturers must, from 1975 on, include a pollution-
controlling device in their cars. The device of choice, the cat-
alytic converter, cut many pollutants, but not lead - in fact,
lead would ruin it. For Congress to require motorists to pay for
the device and then let it be ruined by leaded gas would look
foolish. So, out of concern for the well-being of catalytic con-
verters and their own reputations, the legislators backed the
rule requiring new cars to use only unleaded gasoline.
Congress could not tell voters in 1970 that this rule to pro-
tect pollution control devices was sufficient to protect chil-
dren from lead. Children would still be exposed to lead from
gasoline for many years after 1970.The rule did not even take
effect until 1975, and when it did, older cars could still use
leaded gas and emit lead in their exhaust. In 1975, there
would be roughly 100 million leaded gas-burning cars on
the road, and many of them would remain there, emitting
lead well into the 1980s.
To mollify voters demanding protection for children, Con-
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gress had to do more in 1970. But lawmakers could not sim-
ply ban leaded gasoline forthwith; voters also wanted cheap
gasoline, and adding lead reduces the cost of refining it. The
lawmakers were caught between voters' demands to get the
lead out and to keep gas prices down.
When Congress is faced with a controversial choice about
pollution, it generally follows a two-step plan that goes like this:
u Step 1: Congress announces some lofty goal, but skirts
the difficulties of attaining it.
* Step 2: Congress orders a government agency to
achieve the goal and thus to take the heat for the difficult
steps needed to do so.
Congress danced this two-step with lead:
m Step 1: Congress announced that a health-based air
quality standard for lead must be achieved by May 1976.
m Step 2: Congress ordered the EPA to establish the rules
to achieve that standard by the deadline.
Here as elsewhere in the Clean Air Act, Congress bestowed
its rulemaking power on the EPA. It did so for what seems like
a noble reason: Only an expert agency insulated from poli-
tics will do the right thing. And the EPA, with the best of inten-
tions, accepted that duty while environmentalists (myself
included) cheered.
But the road to hell is paved with good intentions - and
dusted with lead.
LEAVING THE LEAD IN
After passing the statute, members of Congress-Democrats
and Republicans, liberals and conservatives-lobbied the EPA
to do nothing about the leaded gasoline used by the pre-1975
cars. The agency, understandably, went into a stall.
In late 1972, my colleagues and I at the Natural Resources
Defense Council sued the EPA and won a decision that prompt-
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ed it, at last, to issue a rule to reduce the amount of lead in lead-
ed gas. This victory was followed by many others:
m The courts upheld the new rule.
* Other courts ordered the EPA, against its pro-
longed resistance, to set a health-based air quality
standard for lead.
m In setting the air quality standard for lead, the EPA
accepted our argument that it must not consider the
cost of compliance in setting such health-based
standards.
m The courts upheld the air quality standard for lead.
Yet, those legal victories did not translate into any reductions
in lead for many years. In fact, the amount of lead used in gaso-
line increased slightly from 1970 to 1975. Meanwhile, the May
1976 deadline to protect health was approaching.
When Jimmy Carter won the presidential election in 1976,
I thought he would translate his tough campaign talk on the
environment into tough action on lead. But President Carter
ordered the EPA to relax the broader lead reduction schedule
adopted by his Republican predecessors. The administration's
justification for the change was to combat the energy shortage
of the late 1970s. That made little sense; lead does not let refin-
ers get more gasoline out of a barrel of crude oil. Carter's grant-
ing refiners leeway on lead did nothing to shorten the lines at
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the gas stations, but it did let him seem to be doing something
about them.
Fortunately, lead in gasoline began to decline in the late
1970s, mostlybecause the pre-1975 cars were graduallybeing
junked. By 1985, so many of the old cars had gone to auto heav-
en that the large oil companies found it unprofitable to con-
tinue distributing leaded gasoline in addition to the unleaded
variety. But they did not want to drop leaded gas on their own,
for fear of losing market share to small refiners who would still
sell it. So Big Oil asked Ronald Reagan's EPA to ban almost all
lead in gasoline on the grounds that it is dangerous to health,
and the agency complied. The EPA finally got tough on lead, but
only after powerhouse corporations, worried about competi-
tion, got involved.
A PUBLIC HEALTH CATASTROPHE
What would have happened if, in 1970, Congress had not
tried to mollify voters by leaving the lead rulemaking to the
EPA? The legislators could not have flatly rebuffed the pop-
ular demand to protect the children. They would have had
to enact a rule cutting lead in gasoline. That rule would have
been a compromise, but it likely would have gotten rid of at
least half of the lead over the next several years. The major
oil companies would not have been happy, but they also
would not have been too unhappy because they all would
have been bound by the same rule. There would have been
a cost involved, but it would have been small - less than a
cent per gallon - and it would have been passed on to
motorists. The only ardent opponents to such lawmaking
would have been the lead additive suppliers, but they could
not have stopped the rule. Their revenues were tiny com-
pared to those of the automakers, and even the automakers
were unable to stop Congress from requiring emissions from
new cars be cut by 90 percent in only a few years.
So why did Congress not itself enact a rule to cut lead in the
gasoline used by old cars? Because the lawmakers did not want
the criticism that would have been heaped on them from all
sides. Some voters would have wanted all the lead out right
away; others would have complained about the increase in gas
prices. Congress's job is to shoulder responsibility, but the leg-
islators instead opted for a solution that let them take credit for
protecting health without having to make a controversial deci-
sion that might hurt them in the next election.
The upshot is that lead came out of gasoline much more
slowly than if Congress had made the rule itself. The delay led
to most children in the United States experiencing blood lead
levels in excess of the 10 micrograms per deciliter of blood
(tg/dL) that the Centers for Disease Control now define as the
threshold of lead poisoning. In the mid-1970s, the median child
in the United States was at 12 tg/dL. Many children, of course,
had blood lead levels well above the national median. The medi-
an child in New York City was at 19 ptg/dL. And, within New
York and other big cities, while children who played on grassy
lawns in quiet neighborhoods got only a little lead from gaso-
line, other children who played near busy streets got huge
doses. After the lead came out of gasoline, the blood lead level
in the median child in both the nation and New York City reced-
ed to 3 tg/dL, which is the level found in children high above
pollution in the Himalayas.
EPA data give some sense of the health consequences of leav-
ing the lead in. The EPA projects that the reduction of lead expo-
sure in 1980 alone achieved under the Clean Air Act averted
6,960 deaths, 3,090 cases of coronary heart disease, and 2,120
strokes. Moreover, some 20,100 children were spared from hav-
FIGURE 1
Lead Emissions, With and Without Congress Taking Responsibility
Lawmiakers' failure poisoned the public
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ing their IQs reduced below 70 from lead exposure.
But consider the additional benefits that would have been
gained if Congress had itself enacted a rule on the leaded gaso-
line used by the 100 million old cars. Leaded gasoline would
have gone down much more quickly, as illustrated hypothet-
ically in Figure 1. Congress's two-step dance to avoid respon-
sibility killed and maimed people on the scale of American
casualties in the Vietnam War.
Those additional deaths and injuries from lead were a pub-
lic health catastrophe - one that took place on the EPA's
watch. But official Washington pretends it did not happen. The
agency and politicians choose to present lead as a victory rather
than a disaster. As President Clinton stated to an approving
Congress in his 1996 State of the Union address, "Lead levels
in children's blood has [sic] been cut by 70 percent" through a
"generation of bipartisan effort."
THE ENVIRONMENTAL CAPTAIN
The lead catastrophe casts doubt on the assumption upon which
the EPA's rulemaking power is based - that "only an expert
agency insulated from politics can do the right thing." The EPA
was supposed to insulate environmental rules from politics. But
it did not; it insulated the politicians from responsibility.
The EPA, moreover, is not necessarily more likely than Con-
gress to reduce pollution. Lead was removed from gasoline
mostly because of the rule requiring lead-free gas in new cars,
for which Congress did take responsibility.
Lead is no aberration. According to EPA data, the biggest ben-
efits from cutting air pollution came from emission limits on
new vehicles. Those limits began at the state level and, after a
predecessor federal agency made few demands of its own, Con-
gress stepped in and imposed a series of laws that limited auto
emissions an additional 90 percent or more. On acid rain and
hazardous air pollutants, the EPA did little from 1970 to 1990,
before Congress stepped in to make hard choices. The biggest
strides on air pollution at the federal level came from public
complaints and difficult decisions by Congress, not from the
EPA imposing the "right thing" on a benighted public.
THE EXPERTS? How did so many of us, myself included, get
the impression that "only an expert agency insulated from pol-
itics" would do the right thing? The Progressives taught that sci-
ence gives experts right answers to policy questions. But it does
not, especially in the case of pollution where the science is full
of uncertainties. In any event, most pollutants have some
harmful effects at even the lowest levels, yet reducing them to
zero is impossible. The upshot is that rulemaking inevitably
requires values judgments. (See "Letting Environmentalists'
Preferences Count," Fall 2003.)
The environmental movement produced a corollary of the
Progressive belief in empowering experts: Because we are all
on Spaceship Earth, we must submit to an authoritative, expert
environmental captain. The Clean Air Act and subsequent
statutes made the EPA's administrator into the captain of the
American compartment of Spaceship Earth. His crew is the
EPA's staff, and the flight deck includes environmental advo-
cates who make sure the administrator obeys Congress's prime
directive of protecting health.
Implicit in this imagery is the idea that only those of us on
the flight deck care enough about the environment, and that
ordinary voters do not. Even voters share this view: According
to one survey, 68 percent ofvoters believe that most people do
not care enough about environmental quality. Notice the irony
of that statistic; it seems that most people care more about the
environment than we think. According to the Winter
2005-2006 issue of the Natural Resources Defense Council
magazine OnEarth, 74 percent of Americans believe that "pro-
tecting the environment is so important that requirements and
standards cannot be too high and continuing environmental
improvements must be made regardless of cost."
HOW CONGRESS CAN DO ITS JOB
Congress should make the rules - not necessarily in all the
detail in the Code of Federal Regulation, but at a minimum with
the basic choices, such as requiring the 90 percent emissions
reduction for new cars. The EPA should have an important role
in the rulemaking: providing Congress with technical infor-
mation and draft statutes, filling in the details on the legislat-
ed rules, and enforcing them. But responsibility for the hard
choices should fall on the elected members of Congress instead
of being shifted to the agency.
That is exactly where responsibility should fall in a democ-
racy. To understand why, consider how environmental advo-
cates would react to a statute in which Congress gave the
Department of Interior the power to decide whether to drill for
oil in the Arctic National Wildlife Reserve. There would be an
outcry, and rightly so, against legislators passing the buck on
such a fundamental choice. But that is what the pollution
statutes do wholesale.
Putting the responsibility for the pollution rules on Con-
gress is poles apart from the environmental legislation that for-
mer Speaker of the House Newt Gringrich introduced as part
of his "Contract with America." It would have broadened the
EPA's discretion rather than reduced it. It would have been
unworkable to boot. I opposed it.
Would Congress have enough time to vote on the pollution
control rules? Yes. The EPA promulgates only five major rules
in an average year. The agency, of course, also promulgates
many minor rules, but there would be many fewer rules if Con-
gress did not unnecessarily grab power from state and local
governments while at the same time pushing the resulting
work onto the EPA.
HOW CONGRESS CAN LET STATES DO THEIR JOB
Some pollution problems require federal resolution. Those
problems fall chiefly under three headings:
m States would fail to control pollution sources that do
much of their harm in other states.
* States would fail to protect critical national assets,
such as our great national parks.
* State-by-state regulation would substantially burden
interstate commerce.
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Such problems are only a tiny portion of the EPA's agenda,
however. Congress requires the agency to preside over all pol-
lution problems, no matter how local.
The chief rationale for Congress making a federal case of
local problems is that the states had bad environmental records
before 1970. It is true that many states were real stinkers, but
the federal government stunk too. Rachel Carson found as
much fault with the feds as with the states in Silent Spring. Her
book, published in 1962, helped to stimulate citizen concern,
and states responded more quickly. As Jimmy Carter's EPA
administrator, Douglas Costle, pointed out, the rules that the
states imposed in the 1960s, before the EPA was created, did
more to cut sulfur dioxide and particulate pollution than those
imposed with the EPA in charge in the 1970s.
The EPA's view of state officials would be turned on its head
if, instead, the states could adopt a two-step of their own where
they would set environmental goals and the EPA had to deliv-
er. In a rare circumstance where the EPA bears the hands-on
burden of achieving an environmental goal, cleaning up aban-
doned waste sites, the EPA has complained that the states ask
for too much environmental protection.
Congress should limit the role that the federal government
plays in local pollution problems. That role should be to pro-
vide information on the quantities ofvarious pollutants emit-
ted by each source, the health impacts at various levels of pol-
lution, and the characteristics of various pollution control
techniques. States and localities should get to decide how to
respond, without interference from the EPA. As former EPA
If Congress couldn't use EPA as a scapegoat,
it wouldn't profit from making
local problems into federal cases.
Some states were so active on air pollution that the auto
industry and the coal companies appealed to Congress to set
up a federal agency as a ploy to slow them down, as former EPA
general counsel E. Donald Elliott and Professor Bruce Acker-
man have shown. Congress complied in the mid-i 960s and the
federal agency, a precursor of the EPA, did slow the states by
providing industry with the argument that states should leave
the problem to the federal agency, by ponderous federal pro-
cedural requirements, and by outright preemption.
Today, support among voters for environmental protection
is broader than it has ever been, Washington is stalemated, and
the states are often in the vanguard.
Another rationale for Congress making a federal case of
local problems is that the states "race to the bottom" in their
competition to attract jobs that voters want. But states, in
fact, do not race to the bottom because voters also want good
environmental quality. Resources for the Future scholar Wal-
lace Oates found that the empirical studies "do not provide
much overall support for the existence of a race to the bot-
tom. In fact, one can reasonably argue that they point more
in the opposite direction - to a race to the top rather than
the bottom."
But the EPA has a jaundiced perspective on the states
because the EPA's relation to the states is similar to Congress's
relationship to the EPA. Much like the two-step that Congress
imposes on the EPA, the EPA imposes a two-step on the states:
m Step 1: The EPA announces some lofty environ-
mental goal.
m Step 2: The EPA orders the states to bear the political
and financial burdens for achieving it.
administrator Carol Browner stated in releasing emissions
information, "Local residents know what is best for their own
communities and, given the facts, they will determine the best
course of action to protect public health and the environment."
If only the federal government lived by those words.
Some states would be slower in reacting to pollution than
I would like. But that is hardly an argument for the EPA to
supercede; the agency as a rulemaker is slow everywhere. It
takes many years, if not a decade or more, for the agency to
respond to new discoveries about the danger of a pollutant by
putting stronger emission limits into actual effect. Were the EPA
simply to provide information for state policymakers, regula-
tory responses would come much faster.
The agency's tragically slow response on lead preempted
states and localities from protecting their children. In 1971,
New York City adopted an ordinance that would have banned
the sale of gasoline with more than a trace of lead at the end of
1973. But the ordinance was preempted by the EPA, which did
not get nearly that tough until the end of 1985. As a result, chil-
dren died. Even without preemption, the EPA slows down envi-
ronmental protection by states: A strong argument for a state
to do nothing is that the EPA will someday institute regulations
at odds with those the state would impose in the meantime.
WHO BENEFITS?
Why have federal lawmakers mandated a system that is so bad
for their constituents? Because it is good for the lawmakers.
Congress outsources the rulemaking to the EPA so that the leg-
islators can claim credit for protecting health while the agency
bears the inevitable blame for delays, disappointments, and
costs. The scheme is so politically profitable for lawmakers that
Congress applies it to every pollution problem, no matter how
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local. If Congress could not use the EPA as a scapegoat, it would
find no political profit in making local environmental problems
into federal cases.
This approach also benefits the managers of large corpora-
tions. The corporations bear heavy costs for pollution control
(much heavier than needed to produce the environmental qual-
ity we have), but because the costs generally fall on all busi-
nesses, they can be passed on to consumers. Moreover, many
corporate managers prefer to do business with one EPA instead
of many different state legislatures. Corporate big-wigs also like
what they call the "level playing field" of national regulation:
protection from competition because of tougher standards for
new sources and higher costs for small business. Because com-
petition and small businesses are sparkplugs of the economy,
the gain for big business management is a loss for consumers,
workers, and people investing for retirement.
National environment groups benefit from this arrangement
as well. Their power is strongest in Washington, and that power
comes partly at the expense of the thousands of state and local
environmental groups as well as the even larger number of
neighborhood and civic associations that care about their local
environments. Those groups have purchase back home, but the
real action is in Washington - and they must work through the
national organizations. It is no wonder that the environmen-
talists at the local level tend to resent their counterparts inside
the Beltway. If power over local environmental matters devolved
to the state and local levels, the national groups would need to
provide financial support to their provincial counterparts, as the
American Civil Liberties Union now provides financial support
to its state and local affiliates. What keeps the national envi-
ronmental groups powerful relative to their provincial coun-
terparts is not good for the environment or society.
WHAT IS GOOD FOR THE EPA?
Employees and administrators at the EPA may think the cur-
rent setup is good for them. After all, they wield considerable
rulemaking power that would otherwise be in the hands of
Congress and state and local officials.
But that power is severely qualified - and not just by the
open decisions of the president and Congress. Acting more qui-
etly, small cliques of legislators insert "requirements" in com-
mittee reports on appropriations bills. Single legislators anony-
mously put holds on nominees until the EPA hews the line.
White House staffers whisper in the ears of political appointees.
The Office of Management and Budget does its thing. Legisla-
tors lean on the agency, as happened with lead. In those and
many other ways, various potentates hold sway over the EPA,
even though their actions are neither blessed by explicit votes
of any elected body nor subject to the check of accountability.
The EPA has circumscribed power, but full responsibility.
Voters not cognizant of the ways of Washington accept this
arrangement because they have been led to believe that the EPA's
job is simply to impose standards that Congress has enacted -
to make rules by applying statutory criteria to scientific fact and
then catching and prosecuting those who violate the rules. In
this view, Congress has made the policy decisions and now it is
the agency's job to make scientific and prosecutorial decisions.
CONVENIENT LIE Because voters think that the legislators they
elect should take responsibility for the broad choices of poli-
cy, the chief author of the Clean Air Act, Sen. Edmund Muskie,
claimed in introducing the bill in 1970 that it "faces the air
pollution crisis with urgency and in candor. It makes hard
choices .... " But it did not.
Consider, for example, the criterion under which the EPA
is to set supposedly health-based air quality standards. The
criterion assumes that there is some concentration of a pol-
lutant in the air we breathe below which there are no known
health effects. This assumption is false and Senator Muskie
knew so at the time. As he later admitted: "Our public health
scientists and doctors have told us [in 1970] that there is no
threshold, that any air pollution is harmful. The Clean Air Act
is based on the assumption, although we knew at the time it
was inaccurate, that there is a threshold." A known inaccu-
racy is a lie, and in this case, a politically convenient one.
The Clean Air Act calls upon the EPA to determine scien-
tifically the levels at which various pollutants start to harm
health. But the agency also must make a broad policy judg-
ment: How much harm to health is acceptable in view of the
costs to society of averting that harm? Yet, the agency must
deny that it engages in such considerations when setting the
ambient air quality standards. Everyone involved knows this
is a lie. I knew it would be a lie when I urged the agency to
adopt this position in the early 1970s. It was a lie that I want-
ed the agency to tell because I thought it would help protect
children. I now know that the way to protect children would
have been for Congress to come clean and make the federal
pollution rules itself.
The EPA's lie helped to cover up Congress's two-step. Both
together advance the myth that Congress makes the policy
judgments and the EPA makes scientific ones.
To further this myth, the agency pretends that the science is
more certain than it is. Professor Wendy Wagner calls this the "sci-
ence charade." According to a Resources for the Future study:
EPA's norms, staffing patterns, and incentives subordi-
nate science. Instead, EPA is a regulatory agency domi-
nated by a legalistic culture.... Communications
between scientists and policy makers within EPA are
often poor or missing, and scientists do not always
have a "seat at the table" when regulatory decisions are
being hammered out.
The EPA, moreover, misrepresents its scientific findings to
suit political convenience. Its scientists measured dangerous
levels of pollution around the World Trade Center after the Sep-
tember 11 attacks, but the agency said the air was safe. If a pri-
vate firm had done that, it would have been indicted.
For another example, EPA scientists evaluating the PCBs that
General Electric had put into the Hudson River found that:
Cancer risks and noncancer health hazards from
being exposed to PCB's in the river through skin con-
tact with contaminated sediments and river water,
incidental ingestion of sediments, inhalation of PCB's
in air, and consumption of river water as a drinking
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water source are generally within or below [the
EPA's] levels of concern.
The agency thus found that it was safe to drink the river
water all day, everyday, but its press release deleted those reas-
suring words. That pivotal information did not get into major
newspapers. It was convenient to omit this information
because it was politically imperative for the EPA - under both
Clinton and Bush, although for different reasons - to support
dredging some of the PCBs from the river. Calling into ques-
tion the need for dredging would have made it harder for the
agency to do what was politic.
THE EPA'S SOUL
The EPA cannot justify its power on the basis that it was thrust
upon it by Congress. That might have been so when the agency
was just born, but that was 36 years ago. Since then, the agency
has worked actively with Congress to conceal the true nature
of their relationship - that the agency gets some power in
return for taking blame that would otherwise fall on Congress.
And that blame comes from both sides, for failing to protect
health and for high pollution control costs.
The bargain between Congress and the EPA is like the bar-
gain that Faust struck with the Devil. In the legend, Faust is
tired of simply being a learned man and wants to wield
power. The Devil promises to give some of his power to Faust
if Faust will relinquish his soul. In the same way, Congress has
given some of its power (and responsibility) to the EPA, but
the EPA, in participating in this arrangement, has sold its soul
in the bargain.
What a shame this is. The environmental cause went from
having practically no political power to having great authori-
ty, and that authority was bestowed on it because the public
believes it can trust the environmental side. But that percep-
tion can change, and with tragic results.
In Goethe's version of the legend, Faust did not irrevoca-
bly lose his soul when he made the original deal. Rather, he
lost it each day that he let the deal continue. Goethe's Faust
avoids hell despite years of wrongdoing by opening his eyes
to the emptiness of the power lent him by the Devil and start-
ing to behave honorably.
So too can the EPA reclaim its soul. The agency should make
clear that Congress in fact failed to make the policy choices.
Here's how: When proposing important rules, the agency
should enumerate the policy choices that Congress has left to
it and, as Cass Sunstein has suggested, describe the full range
of uncertainty in the various science questions involved. The
notice should also point out the shape that the rule would take
if all the policy choices and uncertainties were resolved in favor
of a tougher rule or resolved in favor of a weaker rule.
The EPA, when issuing a rulemaking notice, should also
point out that Congress has an opportunity to make the poli-
cy choices itselfby issuing the rule instead ofwaiting for the EPA
to do so. Voters should be told that they would gain substan-
tial benefits if lawmakers would shoulder their responsibility.
Not only would voters be able to hold elected legislators
accountable for the policy choices, but rules would be resolved
42 REGULATION FALL 2006
much more quickly than the years that it now takes the agency
to complete the rulemaking process and the subsequent judi-
cial review.
With the prospect that the EPA would act if Congress does
not, the course of least resistance would still be for Congress
to decline to take responsibility. But the EPA could help its old
partner in sin do the right thing by suggesting a change in pro-
cedure that would commit Congress in advance to act on
important rules. It would be easier for Congress to agree in
principle that it should be responsible than for it to be respon-
sible ad hoc. We know this from budget politics, where Con-
gress does sometimes commit itself to process changes that
help to constrain budget deficits, even though Congress has lit-
tle capacity for controlling them ad hoc.
The EPA should propose a statute that calls for the follow-
ing process: The agency would evaluate comments on a pro-
posed rule and publish a final rule. The rule, however, would
not go into effect until enacted by Congress and presented to
the president. Justice Stephen Breyer has shown in detail how
such a process could be structured to work expeditiously.
Congress may not accept this proposal. But by coming
clean, the EPA would at least have saved its soul. Hopefully,
it wants to. 1
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